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Abstract 
There are many similarities between Laos and Cambodia. Because of these 
similarities it seems likely that both countries will share the most important traits of 
their development within the frame of globalization. The paper is to show that this is 
not the case. If one looks at both countries from the perspective of universal history, 
the differences in their current development are of course insignificant. From this 
perspective it is impossible, however, to say anything significant about both 
countries. And if one focuses on a single factor – like the economy or the political 
system – one overlooks the importance of most other global, regional and local 
factors. The theoretical thesis of the paper is that one has to look at the whole 
configuration of factors, which is singular for any historical moment and locality. 
Under the conditions of globalization, the configuration has to include global and 
regional factors. Following Pierre Bourdieu, the factors can be analyzed into social 
fields, forces, and positions. Similarities and differences between Laos and 
Cambodia are discussed in this framework. 
 
Introduction 
Globalization has been one of the key terms in the social sciences during the past 
few years. We have now established a certain consensus about the term. There is 
not only one globalization, but there are several tendencies, most of which have been 
effective for centuries. Globalization is a complex interaction of the global and the 
local with the different parts of the world growing together in many respects. This not 
necessarily entails unification but rather a differentiation that Robertson termed 
glocalization. After the general discussions that already reached a certain conclusion 
several years ago, we now need to take a closer empirical look at the processes of 
globalization. We now have to link the abstract discussion on globalization with social 
theory and empirical methods. What actually happens with local cultures and social 
structures? 
In this paper, I want to do this by taking a closer look at the current effects of 
globalization in Laos and Cambodia. First, I wish to propose a model to integrate 
global and local levels and tendencies, which I want to call a socioculture. I wish to 
analyze the different levels and tendencies as a configuration of sociocultures. After 
the introduction of concepts, I shall say something about the history of Laos and 
Cambodia, about apparent similarities and differences and about the forces of 
globalization. Then I'll take a closer look at the current configuration in politics, 
economics and the public sphere in both countries. To summarize, I will give an 
overview over the Lao and Cambodian sociocultures and their relation to the 
tendencies of globalization. 
 
Configuration of Fields 
We are all familiar with the concept of social structure. When we hear the word, we 
usually think of models like the distribution of income or the class struggle. 
Diagram 
I want to introduce a different model, which I derive from Pierre Bourdieu and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein. Bourdieu broke down the social world into something he called social 
fields, which are spheres of social action with their own logic and goals. He was 
mainly interested in the distribution of power on these fields. Bourdieu saw the close 
relationship of the concept of field with Wittgenstein's concept of a language game. 
Wittgenstein suggested that there is not one fixed meaning of a word but that the 
meaning varies according to the social circumstances in which it is used. He said that 
these circumstances are not arbitrary but follow certain models that are similar to 
games. When one enters into linguistic interaction, one is expected to follow the rules 
of the game. Wittgenstein was not very interested in power, he looked at the way 
those games were played. I think in the analysis of social interaction, both aspects 
have to be looked at – the ways of playing the game, or the culture, and the 
possibilities of playing the game, or the social structure. That is why I want to speak 
of a socioculture. 
There are different fields in modern societies, such as politics, economics, arts, 
media and so on. The metaphor of a game illustrates that. There are different games 
and different types of games, for example baseball, football, board games and card 
games. Each game has its own rules and goals. And whoever is good at one game, 
is not necessarily good at another, although one is usually good in various games 
that require similar skills. This is true for social fields as well. To act in society, one 
needs certain skills, and often more than that: one may need a title, money, authority 
and so on. Bourdieu subsumed all of these preconditions for social action under the 
concept of capital. I would rather speak of resources to confine the term capital to 
economics only. Every field and game requires different resources that have less 
value on other fields. On the academic field for example, you need a title to be fully 
eligible for all types of action on the field. This title has some – although less – value 
on other fields as well. It increases your chances and possibilities for example in 
economics, politics, and the media. It has practically no value on the field of sports, 
however. The value of your knowledge is even more confined to the academic field. 
And your manner of speaking, which is a prerequisite for any success on the 
academic field, will even be a detriment on most other fields. 
Every field has its own rules, goals and requirements. This means, we don't have one 
position in one homogeneous social structure, but we have different positions on 
different social fields. To determine the structure of a given society would require to 
determine the different fields, their relative importance and the distribution of 
resources required on these fields. Let us return to our metaphoric example – which I 
will turn into an illustration now. In the US, baseball and football are the most 
important games. Whoever is well equipped to play one of these games, has good 
chances to be a star. We can now say, he has good chances to get a good or leading 
position on the field of sports. In order to get a similar position as a swimmer or even 
a female soccer player, you have to achieve a great deal more – that means you 
have to aquire more capital and possibly to aquire additional capital on other fields. 
From this example it is evident that physical qualities and sex function as social 
resources as well. No woman can become a football or baseball star. 
In societies that consist of village communities, it makes little sense to distinguish 
between different fields – although one can distinguish between different games with 
different sets of rules. That is why Emile Durkheim called life in the traditional village 
a total social fact. All social relations between two persons are more or less present 
in every interaction between them. This is mainly due to the fact that all persons in 
the village know each other and have to deal with each other in every social game. In 
bigger societies, there is a differentiation of fields and a rise in anonymous contact. In 
fact, differentiation is one or even the main characteristic of development. In this 
paper, I want to refer to development as a change in socioculture to meet more 
difficult and complex tasks, whereas the term modernization is to signify the rise in 
economic and administrative efficiency. This distinction may appear somewhat blurry 
and arbitrary at this point, but it will make more sense later on. It is based on the 
argument in Norman Jacobs' book on "Modernization without Development". 
It is necessary to look at the evolution of fields to understand their relationship and 
their structures. 
 
Background 
From the perspective of universal theories, there is hardly any difference between 
Laos and Cambodia. They even share a lot of features with most other developing 
countries around the globe. There are pronounced inequalities between urban and 
rural regions, between ethnic majority and minorities, mountain and valley peoples, 
national capital and periphery, rich and poor and between different regions. 
Data: These differences already form a configuration that evolved historically. It is 
rather complex in itself. Its analysis would lead to far here. 
As far as history, socio-economic data and political structures are concerned, Laos 
and Cambodia bear an even closer resemblance. In both countries important political 
entities rose and fell several centuries ago. The best known are Angkor, which 
covered present-day Cambodia as well as some of Laos and Thailand, and Lan 
Sang, which included Laos and Northeastern Thailand. These entities were not 
oriental despotisms or bureaucratic states but loyalties of minor princes to one major 
prince. They have been adequately described by Oliver Wolters as mandala, that is 
as circles of power forming part more encompassing circles of power. The Tai have 
their own term for this type of structure, müang. 
Diagram: The villages form the basis of the mandala-structure. They are dominated 
by a large village or a city, which in the past was usually fortified and had a market. 
The city rulers paid tribute to a more powerful ruler in a bigger city. He in turn 
sometimes paid tribute to the Chinese emperor. 
The mandala of Angkor and the müang of Lan Sang came to be dominated by the 
larger political entities of Siam and Vietnam. When the French subdued the region in 
the 19th century, they created two new states with the names of Laos and Cambodia. 
As in other colonial territories, hitherto non-existent borders were drawn and officially 
fixed, regardless of historical, cultural and ethnic ties. The French did not have much 
interest in Laos and Cambodia and did little to develop their economy, administration 
and education. But the French presence changed the societies significantly. A 
western-type urban culture developed, a small but important group of intellectuals 
came into existence, a modern nation-state was founded, the minorities and all types 
of periphery were integrated into a larger political structure that included hitherto 
unknown taxes, and slavery was abolished. Except for persons who were more or 
less directly paid by the French, most of the population was not content with French 
rule. After the defeat of the French in the Second World War and their replacement 
by the Japanese, hardly anybody in Laos and Cambodia wanted them to return. 
When they did return in 1946, a struggle for independence and a civil war ensued. 
The final result was the foundation of the socialist states of Laos and Cambodia in 
1975. The socialist revolution was carried out in both countries by peasants from the 
periphery under the leadership of a part of the educated elite. After the revolution, the 
rest of the elite and the majority of the urban middle class left Laos and Cambodia. 
So far, the history of both countries can be told in the same terms. As we all know, it 
differed greatly after 1975. To explain this, a closer look at history is necessary – for 
which time is too short here. But I will mention a couple of important points later on. 
The historical resemblance of both countries is paralleled by similar socio-economic 
and political sociocultures. The mandala continues to be the basis of political life until 
today. It rests on ties between persons of a superior and an inferior rank. Ernst 
Boesch and Norman Jacobs have described this relationship for Thailand as 
patrimonial. A patrimonial relationship is not simple domination but something like an 
exchange of protection against loyalty. This often includes the exchange of labor for 
remuneration as well. The patrimonial socioculture evolved from the family. In 
traditional villages, more or less all inhabitants are related to each other. The 
structure of a Southeast Asian village very much resembles the structure that we 
experience when we have a family reunion. Whereas villagers are related, people in 
a patrimonial structure mostly are not. They act as if they were, but they can leave 
the structure any time they want. And they expect the respective duties to be fulfilled, 
which is not necessarily the case in a family. 
Political culture in Laos and Cambodia can be characterized as patrimonial, while 
peasant culture is that of kinship. This is true for urban social relations and many 
economic relations as well. The economy of both countries is essentially rural 
however. Most inhabitants of Laos and Cambodia are peasants. Under the French, 
the Americans and the socialists, the small effort of industrialization and urbanization 
has been financed through external aid. This still is true today. Money for the national 
budget and capital investment almost entirely comes from abroad. 
Data: It is easy to see that many important socio-economic data are identical for Laos 
and Cambodia. 
 
Differences in the Background 
Looking exclusively at the preceding paragraphs it would be impossible to explain 
why in Cambodia up to three million people were killed after 1975, but in Laos just up 
to 30,000. I don’t want to attempt an explanation here but I do want to point to a 
couple of important factors. The Lao socialist leadership comprised members of the 
royal family and members of various minorities. Therefore, it was capable of gaining 
the support of a substantial percentage of the population. Its politics pursued the goal 
of national union and independence intelligently (Evans, Rowley 1984: 26f). In 
foreign politics, it tried to balance the influence of external powers in order to 
preserve independence and security at the same time. In the interior, it tried to follow 
an ideologically based socialist program but quickly revised it when difficulties 
appeared. This was most obvious in economics as cooperatives were shut down and 
market structures allowed after only a few years, but also in religion as the Buddhism 
was fully allowed and even supported after a very short period of suppression. In 
short, the Lao leadership adopted a pragmatic attitude that had been characteristic of 
politics in the region during the preceding centuries. In many regards, Laos returned 
to pre-French structures. Most Laotians were subsistence farmers living in extended 
family structures. The elite dominated politics and the tiny money economy, which 
were patrimonially structured. However, most of the educated elite was gone, up to a 
third of the population was displaced and party control extended to every village. 
That is, Laos now was an integrated nation state based on traditional structures 
without economic and intellectual resources. 
Diagram: Seemingly, the precolonial structure of an elite, a small group of city 
dwellers and the peasantry along with the Buddhist order was reproduced. But the 
socialist party formed an all-encompassing structure that did not comply with the 
muang-model. It also contained bureaucratic elements. In a way, politics was the only 
social field under socialist rule. There was no independent economic field or civil 
society. But there were the spheres of village life and of the Buddhist order.  
Cambodia also returned to an entirely agrarian economy under the rule of a socialist 
leadership. This leadership, however, was neither internally nor externally pragmatic. 
Most intellectuals and city dwellers were killed, a considerable amount of the families 
torn apart or destroyed, a lot of the material heritage dismantled (Ledgerwood 2ff). 
Unlike in Laos, Buddhism was prohibited and brutally oppressed. And whereas in 
Laos, the typical socialist program of education for all was inaugurated, in Cambodia 
the slogan read, education for none (Evans 1998: 153). The leadership sought no 
balance with its neighbors but provoked a war with Vietnam and tried to destroy all 
traditional as well as modern structures. One of the reasons for this was its lack of 
ties with the old royal elite and the majority of the population (Evans, Rowley 1984: 
22). It succeeded at making the old king, Sihanouk, the formal head of state, 
however, and at gaining the support of China and the United States against Vietnam. 
(Without Lon Nol deposing Sihanouk in 1970, the revolution would have had no basis 
in the population, as Sihanouk – contrary to the Lao and Vietnamese royalists – was 
the legitimate king and an enemy of colonialism, that is a nationalist.) On this basis, it 
was capable to retain power until January 1979 when the Vietnamese overran 
Cambodia and installed a fraction of the Cambodian elite that was friendly to Hanoi. 
Even though the Vietnamese withdrew and the international community took charge 
of Cambodia in the early 1990’s, this elite remains in power up to this day. Apart from 
this, a completely fresh start has been attempted with the intervention of the 
international community. If we now combine this intervention with some of the 
general differences between Laos and Cambodia, we might be tempted to conclude 
that the developmental outlook for Cambodia should be much better than that for 
Laos. 
Data: Cambodia has a much bigger population on approximately the same surface. 
This means a higher population density – which usually is a precondition for 
development. Cambodia produces more rice and has a lower external debt. The 
country is less mountainous, has access to the ocean, more suitable waterways and 
two train lines, whereas Laos has none. 
We now have to link these data to the global configuration. Laos has opened up for 
the international community much later and much more hesitatingly than Cambodia. 
It not only shows worse socio-economic data but still adheres to the socialist one-
party system, which is supposed to contradict the requirements of a market economy. 
A closer look at the tendencies of globalization in Laos and Cambodia will cast a 
different light on the outlook for both countries. 
 
Globalization 
In 1979, when the Vietnamese backed government took over in Cambodia, economy 
and society were utterly destroyed. Little reconstruction was done during the 
following ten years because the government received no support from the West, only 
from the impoverished Eastern Block countries. Fighting continued as China and 
some Western countries still supported the Khmer Rouge and their formal ally, 
Sihanouk (Roberts 2001: 11). In 1986, the Soviet Union pulled out of Southeast Asia 
and advised Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to adopt a more market-oriented 
economy. China and the US opposed the emerging regional solution of the 
Cambodian situation and called for an international conference, which was held in 
Paris in 1989 (Roberts 2001: 22). An interim government was installed that included 
the Khmer Rouge. A democratic election was prepared, which took place in 1993. 
The years of preparation was controlled by international forces known under the 
acronym UNTAC. With the UNTAC, globalization reached Cambodia. This meant the 
arrival of several thousands of Westerners, who brought an incredible amount of 
money, technology and modern lifestyles with them. They are also believed to have 
brought AIDS and other diseases. After the election in 1993, the UNTAC left 
Cambodia. Their money had been distributed. Because of the patrimonial structures 
it had found its way into the pockets of the Vietnamese influenced ruling elite under 
the leadership of Hun Sen and Chea Sim. Prices had gone up (especially in real 
estate), a large sector of prostitution had emerged, and modern lifestyles had 
become familiar and desirable to every Cambodian. 
Globalization entered Laos much slower and under considerable control of the 
socialist leadership. Along with Vietnam and Cambodia, the first economic reforms 
were made in 1979, followed by the more comprehensive reforms in 1986. The 
country did not really open up for foreign tourists and capital until 1994. During the 
whole period, foreign aid grew more or less constantly. Today per-capita foreign aid 
is higher in Laos than in Cambodia. A few years ago, a considerable amount of Lao 
peasants had never seen aid workers, tourists or businessmen – not even soldiers 
during the Second Indochinese War. Television is just starting to reach the most 
remote areas. When I asked Lao near the Vietnamese border for their material 
wishes, none of them mentioned a car or a TV set. They wanted practical things for 
their peasant life, for example a fish pond or a small tractor. Cambodians that I 
asked, wanted cars and houses – just like ourselves. It is safe to conclude that 
globalization affected Cambodia earlier, deeper and more pointedly. 
Table: Some indicators for modernization under the conditions of globalization are 
the importance of the service sector, the arrival of foreign tourists and the number of 
TV stations in the national language. 
Diagram: Another indicator for modernization is language. In Laos, personal 
pronouns have not yet become the dominating form of address as in Thailand or 
Cambodia. Lao use kinship terms to address each other. Personal pronouns are 
confined to urban environments – or more generally, to anonymous contact. In 
intercourse, they are reciprocal, whereas kinship terms are fixed to one person. They 
express a hierarchy, more precisely, a family or patrimonial relationship. They are the 
standard and often only form of address in the village. In Lao cities and in Thailand 
they have become rare. My hypothesis (which is not empirically validated) is that they 
have become much rarer in Cambodia as well. 
 
Political Field 
I now want to take a closer look at three important fields in both countries, the 
political field, the economic field and the public field (that we lately come to call civil 
society). Cambodia is not only more exposed to the tendencies of globalization, it 
also follows the Western model on these three fields. It has a liberalized market 
economy, it is a democracy, and it has – at least somewhat – free and independent 
media. Laos only has a market economy that still is under control of the government 
which means the socialist leadership. 
In both countries, the socialist leadership tried to level social differences as far as 
possible. The leveling stopped short of the leadership itself. The leadership – before 
and after the revolution – has always consisted of a patrimonially structured group. 
Most members of this group are linked through family ties. In Laos, the same families 
run the country today that have run the country before the revolution. Only the most 
exposed individuals and a couple of family names have disappeared (e.g. the 
Sananikone and the royal family of Champassak). Below the elite, social structure 
has not changed very much either. The peasant society is structured through kinship, 
the urban society through patrimonialism. One of the important changes in 
postrevolutionary society was of course the party. The party offered the possibility of 
upward mobility, the leading revolutionary families even gained access to the elite. 
This means, the majority of the population lives in traditional kinship structures, the 
rest in patrimonial or bureaucratic structures which allow upward mobility. At the 
same time, the position of the elite itself remains unthreatened. This structure has 
been fairly stable. It will increasingly come under pressure, however. First, the elite is 
growing too big; factional struggles between families and political groups as well as 
economic competition result from that. Second, globalized city dwellers do not want 
to raise their social position through the party alone. Third, the party structure has 
always interfered with traditional structures, which will become a more serious 
problem as peasants find a better infrastructure to organize themselves. I will return 
to all three points later. 
The structure of the Cambodian elite doesn't seem to differ much from that of the Lao 
elite. It has a patrimonial structure and rests on the shoulders of a socialist party. 
Roberts rendered a perfect description of this patrimonial structure, even if he doesn't 
use the term: ”Power in Cambodia, both traditionally since pre-Angkorean days and 
contemporarily since the 1970s, has been of an absolutist nature, with little tolerance 
of opposition. Underpinning this is a system of patronage and clientelism that seeks 
to ensure the preservation of elites by lower ranks, and to ensure so far as possible 
positions of economic and sometimes social privilege by elites. Loyalty passes 
upwards … Gifts … passed downwards” (2001: 32). There are important differences, 
however. The leadership around Pol Pot ousted almost the entire prerevolutionary 
elite. Some of it returned with the Vietnamese backed socialists around Hun Sen and 
Heng Samrin after 1979. That is, the present Cambodian elite has not organically 
evolved. Apart from that, the socialist party and the elite face competition ever since 
the Paris conference in 1989. Let me cite Roberts again: The Paris conference 
"attempted to implant equality and individual choice in a society governed, and 
financed, through hierarchical inequality and group loyalties" (2001: 34). Democracy 
contradicts patrimonialism. Violence often ensues to solve problems that are foreign 
to patrimonial structures. The intervention of the international community – which is 
one characteristic of contemporary globalization – brought about a democracy with 
free elections, which contradicts both patrimonialism and socialism. In patrimonial 
and socialist structures every individual has his or her fixed and secure position with 
the possibility of upward mobility. Democracy is a threat to security, especially of the 
elite. Hun Sen and his clientele reacted to democracy by closing the elite and 
manipulating the elections. In 1993, the royalist opposition won the elections. The 
entire administration still was in the hands of the patrimonially structured clientele. 
The administration refused to cooperate with the winner of the election, who was 
forced to let Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party rule and to leave the country in 
1996 (Roberts 105-136). Hun Sen learned from the inconvenience and ensured the 
victory of his party in the next elections in 1998 through massive propaganda, 
division of the opposition and creating public insecurity (Roberts 189). The same 
strategy led to success in the last elections. It had to be somewhat more drastic, 
however, as Cambodia's regional and global integration  Some of you may remember 
the assault on the Thai embassy in Phnom Penh on January 29, 2003. The event 
was staged by the ruling elite to arrest several members of the opposition, prohibit 
public gatherings until the elections in July and to monopolize the public field. (31 
members of the opposition even lost their lives under unknown circumstances; 
Weggel 2004: 257.) Cambodia had to pay a high price for the assault, as it paid an 
indemnity of 6 million dollars to Thailand, the vital border remained closed for several 
months, less tourists arrived and thousands of Cambodian guest workers were sent 
home from Thailand. From Hun Sen's point of view, the assault was still successful, 
however. The Cambodian People's Party received 47 percent of the votes and 
remains the ruling party. (A pleasant_side effect of the assault was the destruction of 
the offices of the Shinawatra mobile phone company, which is owned by the Thai 
premier – as its greatest competitor is Hun Sen's mobile phone company.) In spite of 
formally being a democracy, Cambodia has been run by the same group around Hun 
Sen and Chea Sim for 12 years and a total of 26 years now. The democratic façade 
has only resulted in a waste of money, energy and lives. 
 
Economy 
The failure of democracy in Cambodia has another side effect. While Laos has a 
considerable interior stability, the frequent outbreaks of violence in Cambodia have 
contributed to the country's negative image in the world. Foreign direct investments 
have continuously risen in Laos, while they have dramatically fallen in Cambodia. In 
1995, Cambodia received 2,4 billion dollars of FDI, in 2001 only 200 million, which 
rose in 2002 to 235 million. Foreign aid basically had its peak with the UNTAC 
mission, whereas it has been rising steadily in Laos. Both countries have little to offer 
to the rest of the world, but Cambodia may be in a worse position than Laos. Both 
have entered the WTO, which will be a big drawback for the textile industry. In 
Cambodia, however, textiles account for 90 percent of the exports, while in Laos 
electricity is the major export item. Both countries suffer from ecological destruction, 
especially deforestation, lack of qualified manpower, poor infrastructure, little 
transparency and lacking capital. Both economies depend entirely on help from 
abroad, and as I said, this has been increasing in Laos and decreasing in Cambodia. 
The most important criterion concerning the future of the economy of both countries 
is the emergence of an autonomous economic field with actors who can and may 
follow the rules of a market economy. In Laos and Cambodia, the economy is 
dominated by the political elite, but there are several important differences. The Lao 
leadership doesn't face any competition on the political field. Its dominating position 
remains unchallenged. Therefore, a certain amount of economic competition poses 
no threat. This is not true for Cambodia, where economic power can be used for 
political propaganda and competition. Furthermore, Cambodian leaders engage into 
economic activities themselves. That means, the patrimonial structures are evident. 
In Laos, however, the leading politicians officially own nothing. Their family members 
run businesses and own real estate. Even though everybody knows about the family 
ties, patrimonialism is a little more covert – and socialism more overt. Finally, a 
certain middle class emerges in Laos at a much faster pace than in Cambodia. 
Chinese, Vietnamese, returnees from abroad and persons with higher education in 
English and economics are acting as dynamic entrepreneurs. The very successful 
ones are admitted to the elite – mostly through marriage. As this social stratum is a 
threat to the ruling elite in Cambodia, its emergence is less pronounced there. 
Economic inequality is more extreme in Cambodia. One could almost say that 
Cambodians are either rich or poor. The slums of Phnom Penh are vast, begging is 
common, and there are at least 20,000 kids (many of them orphans) living in the 
streets (Brown 2000: 38-42). In this situation, the higher population density in 
Cambodia, which is usually considered a prerequisite for development, reveals itself 
to be detrimental. Until quite recently, Laotian peasants did not really know any push 
factors to leave for the city. The first beggars in Vientiane, who I first saw in 1999, 
have come because they had neither field nor family in their village any more. This 
tendency has greatly increased ever since, but it is much more pronounced in 
Cambodia. 
 
Public Field 
Symbolic globalization has reached Laos and Cambodia. People do not define their 
social position exclusively in relation to their village or their mandala but increasingly 
in relation to the world population. Global integration entails national integration, 
which means that people are not primarily members of a village, a group or a 
mandala but of a nation (Tanabe, Keyes). Global and national integration is more 
advanced in Cambodia than in Laos. Laotians still have strong family and group ties, 
which were severed in Cambodia under Pol Pot. Furthermore, the dominating ethnic 
group in Laos does not feel like the lowest class of global society, because there are 
always the ethnic minorities below. This is more difficult for the Khmer in Cambodia 
because the minorities are much smaller and more confined to the periphery. 
Table 
All Lao can consider themselves a middle class in relation to the minorities. They 
have always felt superior, especially as the minorities have no influence on the 
symbolic universe. Very few have a writing system, none have national symbols or 
overarching institutions. In Cambodia, almost everybody below the elite has to 
consider him- or herself as member of the lowest class. The life-styles of the UNTAC 
staff and the elite as well as soap operas on television demonstrate their poverty – 
and they have no experience of people who are even poorer than they themselves. 
My surveys in Laos clearly showed that people in urban and suburban areas were 
overwhelmingly optimistic as far as the economic situation is concerned. People in 
Cambodia uttered resignation, dissatisfaction and readiness to become violent. But 
Laotians indicated dissatisfaction with the political situation, even though they tend to 
speak less openly than Cambodians. 
There is a public field in Cambodia, although Hun Sen and his clientele try to control 
it. The more they come under pressure, the more they try to monopolize the public 
field. However, the international community does not react favorably to these 
totalitarian tendencies. Foreign donors usually ask for two conditions to be fulfilled: a 
further liberalization of the market and an increase in democracy. Therefore there are 
independent media in Cambodia, which do not exist in Laos. Their lack is 
increasingly detrimental to Laos's development as it hampers learning, differentiation, 
and the emergence of "intermediate institutions" (Fukuyama). People have to rely on 
the wisdom of the party for information and organization. As society grows more 
complex, the party's wisdom frequently fails. But even on the public field, political 
oppression has a positive side effect. While Cambodia has more TV sets per capita, 
Laos has more internet users. The internet offers a certain freedom of speech, which 
the Lao television does not. Therefore, electronic alphabetization proceeds faster in 
Laos. Cambodia has the fewest internet users in Southeast Asia (Weggel 2004: 355). 
 
Configuration of and on Fields 
In modern societies, politics and economics are the dominating fields with the public 
field playing an important role. An important part of social development is the 
differentiation and autonomization of fields. Bourdieu thought autonomization to be a 
descriptive and universal term. But it is just as normative and particular. It only refers 
to periods of history and to non-totalitarian states. In pre-French Laos and Cambodia, 
there had only been a differentiation of village, town and court in the sense of 
mandala as well as the Buddhist order. But I am not sure if these different social 
entities should be called "fields", as all of them were subject to a patrimonial and 
kinship structure. Present-day Cambodia still is a patrimonial state in which kinship 
ties have been seriously damaged and distrust may be more important than loyalty. If 
an autonomous public field and a class of non-political entrepreneurs are permitted to 
develop in Cambodia, the country may be better equipped to meet the challenges of 
globalization than Laos. In Laos, however, the economic field has reached a 
considerable amount of autonomy, which places the country in a better global 
position than Cambodia. So far, political oppression may have contributed positively 
to development in Laos, as it has weakened the destabilizing effects of globalization. 
But as the economic middle stratum needs more freedom to develop, political 
oppression becomes increasingly detrimental. Earlier on, I mentioned three sources 
of potential conflict in Laos: the possible closing of the political elite for the new 
economic elite, lacking freedom of the urban middle class and the organization of 
peasants. All three problems would be resolved by a further separation of the political 
field from the economic field. We can see this by comparing the structure of both 
fields. 
Picture: Especially important is the relationship of economic and political elite. The 
middle strata on the economic field have little chance to move upward on the political 
field except in the party, therefore they want a decrease in the influence of the 
political field. The peasants hold the party to be responsible for their fate. The more 
they recognize themselves as relatively and absolutely poor, the more they tend to be 
dissatisfied with the government. This is less so in a democracy, where economic 
fate is attributed to the market. 
 
Configurations of Globalization 
We now have to link the configurations of and on the fields with the tendencies of 
globalization, which we discussed earlier. 
Diagram: Cambodia was socially and physically disrupted when the UNTAC entered 
the country in the early 1990’s. The intervention of the international community made 
the Cambodian economy entirely dependent on foreign countries. It changed political 
system formally to a democracy. And it brought Western lifestyles and money into 
Cambodia. This money was absorbed by a small stratum of society, mainly the 
political elite. The position of the elite is threatened by democratic and economic 
competitors. Because of the threat, the elite tends to close itself and to monopolize all 
economic and symbolic resources. Society becomes polarized into a small totalitarian 
elite and a poor population that knows Western lifestyles and wealth from the UNTAC 
experience and television. The population considers itself part of a global lower class 
and has little hope. 
Tendencies of globalization are slowly picking up in Laos, foreign aid has been 
continuously growing and a considerable percentage of the population is full of hope 
for economic improvement. The leadership does not feel threatened by economic 
success of other segments of society, because its dominating position on the political 
field remains unthreatened, which entails a strong position on the economic and the 
public field. In the population, traditional social ties and nets have by and large 
remained intact. And ethnic Lao can consider themselves as part of a middle stratum 
anyway. However, urban and rural poverty will rise with increasing globalization as 
Laos has little to export and needs a lot to import. Only the political field could do 
something about poverty. In fact, the Lao government recognizes this perfectly well. 
One main reason for the socialist party holding on to power is the fear of increasing 
inequality and social unrest. This is a catch 22 situation because the socialist party is 
dominated by a patrimonial elite that is acting on its own account. Other sources of 
conflict are the political control of the public field and the oppression of minorities. 
Both will become more serious with increasing globalization because people will have 
better access to outside information and to networking. 
 
Conclusion 
The sketch of configurations seems complex, but actually has remained very rough 
and even somewhat oversimplifying. I have to admit that the model of sociocultural 
configurations is highly complex and rather inconvenient. It does not even allow for 
clear and simple predictions. But I think it allows for a more adequate picture of social 
reality, which in itself becomes ever more complex with increasing globalization. We 
have seen that the tendencies of globalization are equivocal. And we have seen that 
a faster and more intense onset of globalization is not necessarily helpful for 
development, but globalization can also further the emergence of a public field, of 
networking and communication. 
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